

where it would be less vulnerable to attack. He supervised everything, from the contents of leaflets to be dropped over Cuba to the assembling of ships for the invasion.”

Neither of

Dobbs, *One Minute to Midnight*, p. 16  
Tuesday, Oct. 16, 6:30 ExComm meeting:

“Under attack by the Republicans for his passivity over Cuba, the president had issued a public statement on September 4 warning the Soviets that ‘the gravest issues would arise’ if they developed a ‘significant offensive capability’ in Cuba. He had planted a marker in the sand, and was now committed to defending it.”

“**Last month, I should have said we don’t care,**” Kennedy said wistfully, as if to himself. “But when we said we’re not going to, and they go ahead and do it, and then we do nothing...” His voice trailed off. Doing nothing was no longer an option.”

“Bobby argued the case for an aggressive response to Moscow. ...If Khrushchev wanted war, it might be better to ‘get it over with...take our losses.’ It would not be too difficult to find an excuse for invading Cuba...Perhaps ‘there is some other way we can get involved in this,’ Bobby ruminated. ‘You know, **sink the Maine again** or something...”  
“The discussion turned to the sabotage proposals against Cuba that had been considered by the Special Group **earlier in the day.**”

(Kennedy rejected the mining of Cuban harbors, “an indiscriminate act of war that would result in the destruction of foreign flagships, in addition to Cuban and Soviet vessels. The following day [Oct. 17] the White House sent a memo to the Mongoose team, formally recording the approval by ‘higher authority’—code word for the president—of the eight other sabotage targets, including the grenade attack on the Chinese Embassy.”

17. JCS proposals April for invasion. “Prior to the discovery of Soviet missiles on Cuba, the main problem confronting the Joint Chiefs was how to justify an attack against a much weaker nation. A memorandum dated August 8 outlined various ideas for a staged provocation that could be blamed on Castro, along the lines of the ‘Remember the Maine’ scenario that intrigued Bobby Kennedy:

--We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba;

(Others. Northwoods?) (JCS thought one division enough for rapid control; Marine Corps: three divisions at least, several years.)

Chapter 8, 184—on USS Oxford. (See google)